PRESENTATION

This blog is a compilation of some reflections about individual judgement and decision making.

jueves, 3 de abril de 2014

DANCING INTUITIVELY

In this short reflection I would like to briefly differentiate the intuition and deliberation characteristics that Dijkstra et al. have shown in previous articles (Dijkstra et al. 2012; 2013)  while trying to apply them to my practice of dancing. Due to space constriction I will join theory and example. I am a dancer of Breakdance. Since the beginning, Breakdance has attracted me because of the feeling of freedom and spontaneity it provokes in my mind when I am dancing. Due to I have barely received any formal lesson of Breakdance, I consider myself as an “intermediate” practitioner (relatively experienced, modest knowledge) using the Dijkstra categorization. Hardly all the knowledge I have has been obtained trough trial and error method. I found this method directly related with the global processing style displayed by intermediate artist who based their performances and decisions in intuition. According to this, is easily understandable that when I dance spontaneously, freestyling in dance terminology, usually I cannot access consciously to what and how I dance and, afterwards, I cannot remember what I have done. From my point of view, this is a clear example of how the knowledge acquired by experience is commonly displayed in an intuitive (global, implicit and unconscious) way. On the other hand, some time ago, I decided to analyze what I am doing while I train, trying to reflect on my behaviours and my moves in a more conscious way, using a local processing style. This way I can access to the knowledge in a more explicit way, being able to name and describe the steps and moves. So that, in a competition when I am freestyling I have the possibility of remember a sequence of steps (set) and perform it at the rhythm of the music in a more deliberative way. That would be a proof of how the knowledge acquired using a local processing style can be explicitly stated and analyzed in a more conscious way, and applied when it is required. To finish with, might be interesting to remark the point that the intermediate dancer can suffer from deliberation when he has not analyze their moves and he does not control them in an explicit and conscious way. That would happen for example in a competition when the dancer try to remember consciously a set which he has not interiorize using local processing. The dancer might crashed resoundingly by the mere fact of remembrance. Given these circumstances, freestyling may be the most creative and efficient way to perform for intermediate performers whose main objective is enjoy the moment and let them flow.



References
      Dijkstra, K. A., van der Pligt, J., & van Kleef, G. A. (2013). Deliberation Versus Intuition: Decomposing the Role of Expertise in Judgment and Decision Making: Deliberation, Intuition, and Expertise. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 26(3), 285–294. doi:10.1002/bdm.1759
     Dijkstra, K. A., van der Pligt, J., van Kleef, G. A., & Kerstholt, J. H. (2012). Deliberation versus intuition: Global versus local processing in judgment and choice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(5), 1156–1161. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2012.05.001


THE VALUE OF PUNISHMENT

This short refection will focus on criminal behaviour, specifically, on small offenses like not paying for public transport. Firstly, based on the expected value theory (cite required), a tourist who wonder sneaking or not in the subway of Berlin would calculate as follows. Based on average estimation, taking 4 tickets per day during 6 days, costing 3€ each ticket, entails 72€. The fine for sneaking is 40€. (“BVG.de - Homepage,” n.d.) Supposing that the average tourist has 50% to be caught, that leads to an expected monetary value of 36€ in case of not being caught and a loss of 20€ in case of being caught. So that, for an average tourist, rationally speaking, sneaking in the subway is a good bet. This reasoning would raise again the problem about the quantity of the fines or their actual utility.
But, instead of focus on the amount of money people would lose or gain, I prefer focus my attention on the frame. Supported on the knowledge about the power of framing effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986) and the loss aversion effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991), we can notice that people tend to avoid loses depending on how the information is displayed. Even more, we can suppose certain kind of moral behaviour if we reflect on the fact that the subjects are looking for the option which will harm as less people as possible. Consequently, in order to prevent people take the decision of sneaking in the public transport, I suggest changing the framing of criminal behaviour focusing on the losses of the misbehaviour.
Coming back to our example, we might develop marketing campaigns which target is reminding the users of public transport the costs of their possible sneaks. These campaigns might be even more effective, if we stress the direct loss the sneaking behaviour is causing in the salary of the employees of the service. To conclude, I strongly believe, that the pro-social behaviour could be improved if a message of gratitude is displayed (cite required). For instance:

The driver of this train says: “THANKS FOR PAYING YOUR TICKET.”



References
 BVG.de - Homepage. (n.d.). Content. Retrieved March 29, 2014, from http://www.bvg.de/index.php/en/index.html
      Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions. The Journal of Business, 59(4), S251–S278.

      Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1039–1061. doi:10.2307/2937956